abstract The computation of leastcore and prenucleolus is an efficient way of allocating a common resource among N players. It has, however, the drawback being a linear programming problem with 2 N − 2 constraints. In this paper we show how, in the case of convex production games, generate constraints by solving small size linear programming problems, with both continuous and integer variables. The approach is extended to games with symmetries (identical players), and to games with partially continuous coalitions. We also study the computation of prenucleolus, and display encouraging numerical results.
Introduction
In this paper we study the class of cooperative games, in which costs must be allocated in a fair way among N players. This is an important subject for utility networks, or more generally for all companies subject to regulation rules. The analysis takes into account the possibility of coalitions among players. Note that a new feature of our model is that not all coalitions are allowed, which makes sense in real-world applications. We refer to Boyer et al. [1] for an overview of cost allocation using the cooperative game theory.
Denote by S := {1, · · · , N } the set of players, which are to be interpreted as customers, P(S) the set of coalitions (all possible subsets of S), P 1 (S) := P(S)\{∅, S} the set of non trivial coalitions, and P 2 (S) ⊂ P 1 (S) the set of possible coalitions. Given x ∈ IR N and S ∈ P(S), we denote x(S) := i∈S x i . In the sequel x i will be interpreted as the amount paid by user i, for i = 1, . . . , n, so that x(S) means the amount paid by coalition S. With each coalition S ∈ P(S) is associated a real valued cost c(S). We say that x ∈ IR N is an allocation if x(S) = c(S), and in this case we call x(S) the allocation of coalition S, for all S ∈ P(S). The excess of a coalition S is the amount e(S, x, c) := c(S) − x(S). This is the difference between what the coalition would have to pay if it ignored the other players, and the amount it has to pay using allocation x. A negative excess for coalition S means that it would be advantageous for S to run its own business. In order to avoid that, a possible way of allocating costs consists in maximizing the minimal excess. This amounts in solving the following optimization problem: max ε∈I R x∈X ε; x(S) = c(S); ε + x(S) ≤ c(S), for all S ∈ P 2 (S).
(LP )
Here we take into account the set of possible coalitions P 2 (S) which is a subset of P 1 (S), as well as the set X ⊂ IR N restricting the choice of allocations, as typically will happen in practical situations. We say that the allocation x is feasible if (in addition to the relation x(S) = c(S)) it belongs to X. We call the set of solutions of (LP ) the leastcore. The core is the set of feasible allocation for which every excess of coalitions in P 2 (S) is nonnegative. If the core is non empty, then it contains the leastcore. These two definitions of core and leastcore generalize the usual ones for which X = IR N and P 2 (S) = P 1 (S), see Shapley [12] and the historical references in [8] . If the leastcore is not reduced to one point, one can minimize among its solutions the minimal excess (of coalitions whose excess is not binded). By induction one obtain the prenucleolus, a concept due to Schmeidler [11] (see also the axiomatization in Maschler, Potters and Tijs [7] ).
In the sequel we assume that X is a polyhedron. Then (LP ) is a linear program with N + 1 variables and as many as 2 N − 2 explicit constraints (if P 2 (S) = P 1 (S)), in addition to the "implicit" constraint x ∈ X.
Since the computation of the leastcore and prenucleolus needs to solve a linear program with possibly 2 N − 2 contraints but only N + 1 variables, generation of constraints is a natural approach. We show in this paper that, if the cost function has a certain convexity property, there exists a fast procedure for constraint generation. Then we show that symmetric games have symmetric solutions, and relate some continuous relaxations to the desagregation of classes of small players. Finally we analyse the computation of the prenucleolus.
Our hypothesis on the cost function is a generalization of linear production games discussed in Owen [9] . Generation of constraints in this case was already studied in Hallefjord, Helming and Jörnstein [6] . However, for generating constraints they solve a (mixed integer continuous) problem in which the data of the linear production game are involved, and that may be expensive. By contrast, we solve a problem of much smaller size, and extend the approach, as was already said, to the search of symmetric solutions and to the case of continuous relaxations.
Let us mention also two references related to the subject of this paper, that do not assume that cost functions result from a linear production game. Fromen [2] gave a method for reducing the number of linear programs to be solved in order to compute the prenucleolus; still, these linear programs remain of large size. Preux et al. [10] designed a column generation method for computing the prenucleolus. They give no numerical results, and it is not easy to figure out if this approach can be effective in practical situations.
Constraints generation
Relaxing constraints of (LP ) for some of the coalitions amount to solve the following problem:
where E is a subset of P 2 (S). Let us formulate an algorithm for solving (LP ), based on generation of constraints:
• Find S k ∈ P 2 (S) such that
, for all S ∈ P 2 (S).
•
end loop End
At each iteration the most violated constraint of (LP ) is added. Since the number of constraints of (LP ) is finite, the algorithm terminates. In addition we have the estimate
The first inequality expresses the fact that (
, while the second is a consequence of the relaxation of constraints. Since E k is increasing with k, val(LP E k ) is nonincreasing. Relation (2.1) may be used for designing a stopping criterion.
This approach, however, will not be effective unless we have a fast way of finding the most violated constraint of (LP ). A first step consists in using, instead of the cost function itself, a lower estimate. This is the subject of the next section.
Lower estimates of the cost function
Assume that we have at our disposal a lower estimate of c(·) over P 2 (S), i.e., a function Ψ k : P 2 (S) → IR such that
Then instead of searching the minimum over non trivial coalitions of c(S)−x(S), we may search for the minimum in S of Ψ k (S) − x(S) over P 2 (S). We obtain the following algorithm (we write LB for lower bound) :
end loop End
We have the estimate, similar to (2.1):
This approach via lower estimates of the cost function is of interest of the two following conditions are satisfied: (i) finding the coalition minimizing S → (Ψ k (S) − x k (S)) over P 2 (S) is cheap, and (ii) Ψ k is as close as possible to c(S). A natural assumption is that the lower estimate Ψ k is exact over E k , in the sense that
The the above algorithm terminates, as the following Lemma shows.
Lemma 3.1 Assume that the exactness hypothesis (3.4) holds. Then the algorithm stops after a finite number of iterations, and its output is an allocation of thed leastcore.
Proof. If the algorithm does not terminate, since the set P 2 (S) is finite, we have that S k ∈ E k for some k. By the exactness hypothesis (3.4), Ψ k (S k ) = c(S k ), in contradiction with the stopping criterium at iteration k.
It remains to identify in which situations we are able to construct lower estimates of the cost function, such that the problem of finding S k is tractable. We will see in the next section that these properties are, in a certain sense, satisfied if the cost function has a property of inner convexity.
Convex production games
Assume that each player i is a customer to which must be provided an amount b i ∈ IR p of certain goods. The amount needed by coalition S is b(S) := i∈S b i . Assume also that the cost of providing b is the value function of an optimization program of the following type:
where f : IR m → IR is a convex function. Then we speak of a convex production game; when f is linear this reduces to the linear production game setting (see Owen [9] ). The Lagrangian function of problem (P b ) is (denoting by "·" the scalar product)
with here λ ∈ IR p and s ∈ IR n + . Denote by v(b) the value of (P b ), i.e., v(b) = val(P b ). Letz be solution of (Pb), and let (λ,s) be an associated Lagrange multiplier, that is,
Then for any z ∈ F (P b ), we have that
Minimizing over z ∈ F (P ), and using
Therefore, solving (Pb) provides an affine minorant of v(·), exact (equal to v(·)) atb. Consequently, for all S ∈ P 1 (S),
where λ k is a Lagrange multiplier computed when solving (P b k ). Coming back to the definition of the cost function c(·), we get that
Given S ∈ P 2 (S), denote by 1 S its characteristic vector
We say that y ∈ P 2 (S) if y is the characteristic vector of an element of P 2 (S). It follows that minimizing Ψ(S) − x(S) over P(S) (in order to generate the next constraint) means solving a optimization problem with N variables in {0, 1} and a continuous variable
If the constraint y ∈ P 2 (S) are expressed as linear constraints over {0, 1} n , then (L K ) is in the format of a mixed linear program (with {0, 1} and continuous variables). This holds in particular in the "standard case", when P 2 (S) = P 1 (S), since
In addition, two successive problems of type (L K ) differ only by the addition of one cut. This structure may help for a fast resolution of (L K ) (this is the classical situation in branch and cut algorithms, where hot start options allow to speed up computations).
Remark 4.1
The method presented here is close to the column generation method by Hallefjord et al., [6] . The essential difference is that [6] uses the true value of the cost function for generating the new column, i.e., the problem to be solved at each iteration is (when, as in [6] , we choose P 2 (S) = P 1 (S)):
If the dimension of z is large, or if f has a complex expression, this may be much more expensive, especially during the first iterations where solving (L K ) is quite cheap.
Linear production games
For the purpose of comparison to our previous analysis, we recall in this section a result of Owen [9] (generalized by Granot [5] ), as well as its proof, since the latter is short, for proving the existence and providing a fast computation of an allocation in the core for specific linear production games of the following form:
Min
We denote the lagrangian function of problem (P b ) by
where λ ∈ IR Theorem 4.1 (Owen [9] ) Assume thatb := b(S) is such that problem (P b ) has a finite value. Then the core is non empty, and any dual optimal solution λ is such thatx : S → b(S) λ is an allocation with non negative excess, for all possible coalitions.
Proof. The duality theory for linear programs implies C(S) =b λ , so thatx is an allocation. Given any coalition S, since the feasible set of the dual does not depend on b, and hence,λ is feasible for the corresponding dual problem Max λ≥0 {b(S) λ; c − A λ ≥ 0}. By duality theory again, we have then that C(S) ≥ b(S) λ = x(S), i.e., C(S) − x(S) ≥ 0, proving thatx is an allocation in the core.
For linear production games in the format (P b ), Owen's theorem 4.1 proves non emptyness of the core and provides a cheap way of computing a corresponding allocation. Yet it does provide neither a set of active constraints nor an allocation in the leastcore. Even if the core happens to be equal to the leastcore (but that is not known a-priori), a constraint generation procedure is still useful for computing the prenucleolus; see section 7.
Note also that if we add to the formulation of (P b ) at least one linear constraint with constant right-hand-side, then the proof is not valid.
Symmetries and disagregation
This section deals with the case when each (aggregated) player i is in fact the agregation of n i identical "elementary players". In other words, coalitions with only some of the elementary players are possible, and their cost is a function of the number of elementary players in each class of aggregated players. The disagregated formulation has thereforeN := i n i players. We denote the cost function of the disaggregated formulation again by c(·); it is a function of the fraction of depends only on the number of elementary players of each class in the coalition. We assume in this section, for the sake of simplicity, that P 2 (S) = P 1 (S). Let us show that the disagregated problem has a symmetric solution:
Lemma 5.1 We assume that the set P 2 (S) of feasible coalitions of the disagregated problem is symmetric (i.e., invariant by permutation between players of the same class). Then the disagregated problem has a symmetric solution, i.e., one for which the allocation is identical for all elementary players of the same class.
Proof. The problem of computing the leastcore in the disagregated formulation being convex, its set of solution is convex. Taking the average value of a particular solution and of all those oftained by permutation between players of the same class, we obtain a symmetric solution.
Since these symmetric solutions are socially fair (they allocate the same amount to identical players) it is of interest to obtain them through a dedicated formulation. Denote by y i ∈ {0, 1/n i , 2/n i , . . . , 1} the fraction of elementary players of class i in coalition y ∈ IR N ; the set of feasible coalitions of the disagregated problem (again assumed to be polyhedral) is still denoted X ⊂ IR N . Then the resource allocated to coalition y, where y i ∈ {0, 1/n i , 2/n i , . . . , 1} is still of the form x(y) := i x i y i . The computation of symmetric elements of the least core may be written as max ε∈I R x∈X ε; x(S) = c(S); ε + x(y) ≤ c(y), for all y i ∈ {0, 1/n i , 2/n i , . . . , 1}, i = 1, . . . , N.
(DN LP ) Problem (DN LP ) has (Π i (1 + n i ) − 2) constraints, which is much less than the 2 P i ni − 2 constraints of the naive formulation of the disagregated problem. If a lower bound Ψ of c(·) is available (in particular in the case of a convex production game) then the constraint generation problem may be written as
This is an integer (with in addition a continuous variable) linear programming problem.
Partial continuous relaxation
If a player i ∈ {1, . . . , N } is the agregation of a very large number of players, then we might think of approximating the disagregated problem by allowing y i to be in [0, 1] . This process will be called the continuous relaxation of class i.
Let {1, . . . , N 1 } be the set of players for which a continuous relaxation is performed. A relaxed coalition is an element of S := [0, 1] N1 × {0, 1} N2 , where N 2 := N − N 1 . The (symmetric) allocation for a relaxed coalition y ∈ S is x(y) = x · y.
In the case of a convex production game, to a relaxed coalition must be provided b(y) := (RN LP )
Since this problem has infinitely many constraints, the idea of generation of constraints appears to be quite natural. Given an allocation x ∈ IR N , the problem of finding the most active constraint may be formulated as follows: find y ∈ S such that c(y) − x(y) ≤ c(y ) − x(y ), for all y ∈ S.
(6.12) This is not an easy problem. However, in the case of a convex production game, the computation of v and its subdifferential at points
provides a convex lower bound that we denote again Ψ K . The problem of generating a constraint reads then as
It may be interpreted as a partially (for the first N 1 variables) continuous relaxation of problem (L K ).
Computation of the prenucleolus
In this section we assume for the sake of simplicity that X = IR N . Let η be a Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraints of the linear program (LP ) (η has dimension 2 N − 2). Denote
From the duality theory of linear programs, we know that (x, ε 1 ) ∈ S(LP ) iff it is feasible and satisfies complementarity relations with a Lagrange multiplier:
Let v 1 := val(LP ). Relation (7.14) implies in particular ε 1 = v 1 . It is important, however, to keep ε 1 as a variable in practical computations in order to avoid instabilities (see the remark below). One may try to maximise, over solutions of (LP ), the minimal excess for coalitions in J 1 ; this means solving the following problem: max x,ε1,ε2 ε 2 ; x(S) = c(S); ε 1 + x(S) = c(S), S ∈ I 1 ;
We did not repeat the last constraints of (7.14), which are automatically satisfied at any solution of (LP 1 ).
Remark 7.1 Problem (LP 2 ) is feasible, and also qualified in the sense that there exists a feasible point for which all inequality constraints are strictly satisfied: take (x, ε 1 ) solution of (LP ), and ε 2 < ε 1 . In order to obtain a numerically stable formulation, however, one has to eliminate possibly redundant equality constraints.
Once (LP 1 ) is solved, we may continue solving a sequence of problems of the form max x,ε1,...,ε k+1 ε k+1 ; x(S) = c(S); ε 1 + x(S) = c(S), S ∈ I 1 ;
. . .
Sets I k and J k are defined inductively by
where η k is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraints of program (LP k−1 ). The sequence stops when I k is empty.
Denote v k := val(LP k ). Since the solution (x, ε 1 , . . . , ε k ) of (LP k−1 ), with ε k+1 = ε k , is a feasible point of (LP k ), the sequence v k is nondecreasing. If v k = v k−1 and I k = ∅, then I k is a set of constraints that are always active at any solution of (LP k−1 ), and at the same time η k−1 S = 0, for all s ∈ I k−1 . By the Goldman-Tucker Theorem [4] , we know that a linear program satisfies the hypothesis of strict complementarity. In other words, if a linear program has a finite value, then its dual has at least one solution such that its nonzero components coincide with the set of active inequality constraints at all primal solutions. Such strictly complementarity multipliers coincide with the relative interior of the solution set of the dual program. We denote the dual of (LP k ) by (DLP k ), and the relative interior of the solution set for the dual as ri S(DLP k ).
, this means that strict complementarity with one primal solution does not hold: there exists a coalition S ∈ J k such that
Since the converse inequality always holds, this proves that v k = v k−1 .
If on the contrary η k−1 ∈ ri S(DLP k−1 ), with each S ∈ J k is associated some (x S , ε 1 , . . . , ε k ) ∈ S(DLP k−1 ) (values of ε i are identical over S(DLP k−1 )) such that x S (S) < c(S) − ε k . Denote by j k the cardinal of J k , and setx := (j k )
is a convex set, we have that (x S , ε 1 , . . . , ε k ) ∈ S(DLP k−1 ), and alsox S (S) < c(S)−ε k , for all S ∈ J k , which implies that there exists someε > ε k such that (x S , ε 1 , . . . , ε k ,ε) is a feasible point of J k . Therefore val(DLP k ) >ε > ε k . Remark 7.2 An interior-point solver provides a Lagrange multiplier in the relative interior of S(DLP k−1 ), unless a purification procedure is performed. On the contrary, simplicial algorithms compute in general a Lagrange multiplier on the relative boundary of S(DLP k−1 ).
In order to estimate the number of steps in the computation of prenucleolus, we need the following definition. Definition 7.1 (i) Let I ⊂ P 1 (S) andS ∈ P 1 (S). We say thatS depends on I if the value of x(S) is determined by the values {x(S), S ∈ I}. We say that J ⊂ P 1 (S) depends on I if any S ∈ J depends on I.
(ii)
Step k in the computation of prenucleolus is said to be essential if at least one element of I k does not depend on S ∪ (∪{I ; < k}).
Denote by 1 S the vector of IR n whose ith coordinate is 1 if i ∈ S, and 0 otherwise. If S depends on I, then the linear program Min x x(S); x(S ) = 0; S ∈ I has value 0; by duality, we deduce easily that S depends on I iff 1 S is a linear combination of vectors {1 S , S ∈ I}.
Lemma 7.2 The computation of prenucleolus has at most N essential steps.
Proof. Each essential step adds a linear constraint, linearly independant from the linear constraints already active. Since x ∈ IR N , this may occur at most N times.
Remark 7.3 (i)
In order to understand the nature of non essential steps, consider the case when the leastcore has a unique element. Then the computation of the prenucleolus reduces to an ordering of the non saturated constraints following their value at the leastcore. Obviously the number of non essential steps may be extremely large.
(ii) One could check uniqueness of the solution of problem (LP k ) in order to stop the procedure. (iii) After having solved problem (LP k ), one could try to compute and eliminate all inequality constraints that depend on the equality constraints of (LP k ). However, we do not know any fast algorithm for doing it. (iii) It is useful, in order to have stable computations, to check the linear independance of the equality constraints of (LP k ). This can be done by e.g. a QR type orthogonal factorization, see [3] .
Generation of constraints and prenucleolus

General case
The idea of constraint generation can be extended to the computation of prenucleolus. Without entering into all details, let us specify the essential step, which is the formulation of the problem of generating a constraint after solving (LP k ):
Here k, J k and x are given. If we have at our disposal only a lower boud Ψ of the cost function c(·), the problem to be solved reads as:
In the case of a convex production game (section 4), the lower bound has an expression of type Ψ(S) := max
where L is a finite set. The problem to be solved has an expression similar to the one of problem (L K ) of section 4, but with the additional constraint y ∈ J k . It is useful to rewrite it as a mixed (discrete and continuous variables) linear program in order to be able to solve it effectively. This can be done in the following way. Given z and y in {0, 1} n , denote a z (y) := {i;zi=0}
This sum on nonnegative amounts is equal to 0 iff y = z, and otherwise has value at least 1. The constraint a z (y) ≥ 1 is therefore equivalent to the constraint y = z. Hallefjord et al. [6] already used this formulation for the computation of the prenucleolus.
DenoteJ k := P 1 (S) \ J k the set of excluded coalitions. The problem of constraint generation can be written as
Excluding redundant equality constraints, we always have |J k | ≤ N . Problem (L L,k ) seems therefore of acceptable complexity.
Case of symmetric games
In the case of symmetric games, described in section 5, the approach is similar. The main difference is that since now n i yi is an integer in {0, n i } rather than {0, 1} (see problem (DN LP )), the exclusion constraint has a different expression. We need some notations. Let Y := {y ∈ IR n ; n i yi ∈ {0, . . . , n i }} (8.19) be the set of such fractions y. Given z ∈ Y , we look for an expression of the exclusion constraint {y ∈ Y ; y = z}. For that we split y as a sum y = y + y u , where for each component i, y i = min(y i , z i ) and y 
Numerical experiments
We tested the column generation algorithms of the following family of tes problems. Consider the problem of allocating costs for a water network connecting N different cities. Each city i requires a quantity Q i,t of water over two different time periods t ∈ T . All these city exploit a unique spring s, with no supply restrictions. For each period t, the supply is denoted Y t .
A site numbered n (spring or city) has coordinates (x n , y n ); the cost of building a pipe between two cities n 1 , n 2 of capacity C n1,n2 is proportional to the (Euclidean) distance d n1,n2 between the two sites, the unit price being p. The total cost (for a given coalition) includes also a fixed cost IC; the expression of the total cost is therefore f (C) := IC + p n1<n2 d n1,n2 C n1,n2 .
(9.22)
The flow F n1,n2,t must satisfy the capacity constraints, as well as Kirchhoff's law at each site for all times:
0 ≤ C n1,n2 ≤ F n1,n2,t , for all t ∈ T ∀(n 1 , n 2 ), (9.23) n2 F n1,n2,t + Q n1,t = n2 F n2,n1,t for all t ∈ T, n 1 = s, (9.24) n2 F s,n2,t = n2 F n2,s,t + VY t , for all t ∈ T. (9.25)
The minimum cost design problem for a coalition S is therefore
Min f (C), subject to (9.23) − (9.25).
Note that cooperation is clearly profitable between cities, since (i) the investment cost is shared between cities, and (ii) the two periods structure allows a better use ofd available capacities. The commercial software AIMMS 3.5, and its uniform random number generator, has been used for generating the data of problems with random location of cities. e compared three different methods to compute the prenucleolus: the classical algorithm (no constraint generation), the constraint generation approach in [6] , and our new constraint generation method (called NCGM). Tables 1 and 2 display the results for different problem sizes 1 .
